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dc.contributor.authorMisiuna, Krystyna
dc.contributor.editorKaczmarek, Janusz
dc.contributor.editorKleszcz, Ryszard
dc.identifier.citationMisiuna K., How to Define the Notion of Knowledge which Solves the Gettier Problem, [w:] Kaczmarek J., Kleszcz R. (eds), Philosophy as the Foundation of Knowledge, Action, Ethos, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2016, s. [59]-79, doi: 10.18778/8088-538-7.07pl_PL
dc.description.abstractOur contention is that to solve the Gettier Problem, a notion of infallible knowledge involving the substantial truth theory is necessary. We assume that acts of sense experience have propositional content, and that atomic empirical propositions need the existence of non-mental objects to be true. This approach allows for making the distinction between epistemically good justifiers and ontologically good justifiers, and leads to a definition of propositional empirical knowledge free of the Gettier Problem. Our explication of the Gettier Problem rejects Hetherington’s (2012) view that the Gettier Problem rests on jointly unsatisfiable constraints, sheds a new light on Floridi’s (2004) result, avoids the Pyrrhonian skepticism, as well as the skepticism defended by Kirkham (1984), and vindicates the substantial notion of truth.pl_PL
dc.publisherWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiegopl_PL
dc.relation.ispartofKaczmarek J., Kleszcz R. (eds), Philosophy as the Foundation of Knowledge, Action, Ethos, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2016;
dc.rightsUznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska*
dc.subjectGettier Problempl_PL
dc.titleHow to Define the Notion of Knowledge which Solves the Gettier Problempl_PL
dc.typeBook chapterpl_PL
dc.rights.holder© Copyright by Authors, Łódź 2016; © Copyright for this edition by Uniwersytet Łódzki, Łódź 2016pl_PL[59]-79pl_PL
dc.contributor.authorAffiliationUniversity of Warsaw, Department of Logicpl_PL
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Uznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Uznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska