via scoti
Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti

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### I. RELAZIONI CONGRESSUALI

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### II. COMUNICAZIONI CONGRESSUALI

#### Prima sezione

**LOGICA, METAFISICA E GNOSEOLOGIA**

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In the course of the 14th century the doctrine of Duns Scotus was gradually gaining ever wider popularity at the universities of Europe. To a large extent, this was due to the active role of the disciples of Johannes Duns who were zealous advocates and proponents of the teaching of their master. One of them was Antonius Andreae, a franciscan from Aragonia nicknamed Scotellus for the notorious fidelity to the doctrine of his master and Doctor Dulcifluus for the reputable clarity with which he had expounded it. It is small wonder, then, that the name of Antonius can be frequently spotted in those passages of other philosophers of the time, wherein they refer to, polemically or not, to solutions or analyses characteristic for Scotus and his school.

The evidence of Antonius' popularity as a distinguished representative of Scotism can be found as early as the second quarter of the 14th century, i.e. already in his life time. One of the works which testifies to it is the Quaestiones super Physicam by Theodoricus of Magdeburg, a little known Bolognese Averroist, who taught later in Erfurt. The work, which was written before 1347, exists in three manuscript copies in the libraries of Munich, Wroclaw and Kraków, the main source for this paper being the Munich MS. In several places in the text of the Quaestiones contained in that manuscript, we can find a handful of remarks concerning some Scotist solutions, some of them naming the author of the quoted opinion; in two cases it is the name

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2 I would like to express my thanks to prof. Z. Kuksewicz, who has kindly provided me with his typescript of the Quaestiones.
of Antonius, most probably: Antonius Andreae. By comparison, the name of Scotus appears two or three times.

Admittedly, only two explicit remarks concerning the views of Antonius Andreae in a work containing a few dozens questions is not much, but since the name is mentioned not much less frequently than those of other distinguished philosophers of the time, including Scotus, the fragments pertaining to Theodoricus’ discussion of Antonius’ opinions call for a scrutiny which should help assess to what degree, if at all, the solutions of the latter influence the position of the former. To facilitate the task, I shall analyse the opinions of both against the background of clearly Averroistic solutions given to the respective problems by John of Jandun, one of the paragons of Latin Averroism, n.b. quoted elsewhere by Theodoricus, too.

The remarks to Antonius Andreae in Theodoricus’ *Quaestiones super Physicam* appear in two questions from book I: «Utrum ens mobile sit hic subiectum» (q. 1) and «Utrum potentia materiae distinguatur ab eius essentia» (q. 18); in the first one Antonius’ views are reported in *rationes principales* alongside arguments taken from other philosophers, namely Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome; in the other — Antonius is the only authority quoted in the question (besides Aristotle and Averroes, of course), not in the *rationes principales* but after the *conclusiones* which follow them.

In the first question Theodoricus presents the opinions of Antonius in the following way. The subject of natural philosophy is natural substance and naturality is the *formalis ratio subjectiva* of it, because that which makes a science distinct — in this case: what distinguishes physics from, say, metaphysics — is, by the same token, the means of dividing it into its potential parts and because naturality is the principle of all considerations in science *per se*. Moreover, naturality is a means of demonstration of various of attributes the subject and its parts. The statement is followed by three arguments directed against the opinion, presented earlier in the question and attributed to Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, which finds the *formalis ratio subjectiva* of natural philosophy in mobility.

In the first place, what demonstrates something in a subject by

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3 «Substantia naturalis sit subiectum, quia scientia distinguitur et denominatur ab ipsa similiter dividitur ad divisionem eiusdem in suas partes potentialis. (...) Naturalitas sit formalis ratio subjectiva, quia ratione eius consideratur omnia in scientia *per se*. Item, naturalitas est ratio demonstrandi in quorumlibet attributorum subjecto et suis partibus». Theodoricus, *Physica*, f. 1rb.
means of something else — like mobility, which demonstrates by means of the natural — cannot be a formalis ratio subiectiva. According to the author, mobility requires the mediation of the natural, because it is nature which is the principle of motion and quiescence. Secondly, mobility, which is relative, cannot be a formalis ratio subiectiva, because the latter is intrinsic in the subject. Finally, what receives an object indifferently with its opposite, and mobility a such, is not a formalis ratio subiectiva. Natural substance, on the other hand, is sometimes mobile and sometimes quiescible, so it is received by them indifferently.

Finding a source from which Theodoricus could have taken those theses is not very difficult. There exists only one undoubtedly authentic work of Antonius Andreae pertaining to natural philosophy: a small treatise De tribus principiis naturae. Its initial question «Utrum mobilitas sit formalis ratio subiectiva primi subiecti philosophiae naturalis», which was sometimes edited separately under the title Quae-stio de subecto totius scientiae naturalis, discusses actually the same issue as Theodoricus' «Utrum ens mobile sit hic subiectum»⁴. Most of the theses referred to by Theodoricus can be identified as coming from this question, although they can hardly be said to be direct quotations; actually, they are short summaries of arguments given by Antonius, whose question is about twice as long.

First of all, Antonius rejects the Thomist opinion that ens mobile is the subject of natural philosophy as false and irrational. His arguments prove that the subject of physics can be neither an ens nor mobile. It cannot be the former, because only metaphysics takes ens as its subject, while other, «particular» sciences take for their subjects its subjective parts, like quantity, substance etc⁵. It cannot be the latter either, because mobility cannot be the formalis ratio subiectiva. This argument, or — to be true — a series of arguments is directed against both the Thomist and the Averroist positions. Two of the three arguments cited by Theodoricus can be easily identified: Primo, naturality is an immediate passion of a subject, whereas mobility is not, therefore, since a formalis ratio subiectiva must be an immediate passion of

⁴ This paper is based on a printed edition of De tribus principiis, Venetiis 1489, fols 1ra-4rb.

⁵ «Est (...) scientia quaedam quae speculatur ens in quantum ens, (...) aliarum enim nulla intendit de ente in quantum ens. (...) Aliae autem scientiae particulares (...) accipiant pro subiecto aliquam partem subiectivam, puta quantitatem vel substantiam, etc., ita quod nulla accipit pro subiecto ipsum ens». ibidem, f. 2ra.
a subject, it is naturality which serves this function. Secundo, mobility is relative and therefore it cannot be a formalis ratio subiectiva. The third argument cited by Theodoricus has no direct counterpart in De tribus principiis; though it is probable that Theodoricus could have deduced it from other arguments presented by Antonius there, it is also possible that he took it from another work of Antonius, e.g. his questions to the Metaphysics, or — less likely — the dubious questions to the Physics.

The resulting solutio propria pronounces that it is the natural substance which is the subject of natural philosophy and naturality is its formal ratio subiectiva. An important addition to the discussion of the subject of natural philosophy, which is made by Antonius but disregarded is Theodoricus’ presentation of his views, is the statement that naturality, which is the formalis ratio subiectiva, is identical with quiddity. Theodoricus’ own solution criticises the one of Antonius agreeing with him at the same time He claims, namely, that Antonius is right in maintaining that natural substance is the subject of natural philosophy, yet he is wrong in denying that property to either ens mobile or corpus mobile. His own position is that the three before mentioned concepts together with some other ones, as substantia sensibilis, substantia mobilis, ens naturale, corpus naturale, etc., are all convertible. More precisely, it is corpus which is a per se subject of all physics, and consequently it is corporeity which is precisely the formalis ratio subiectandi. All the remaining concepts apply only denominatively.

6 «Propria formalis ratio subiectiva est immediatus quam quaecumque passio demonstrabilis de ipso subiecto; sed mobilitas non immediate inheret primo subiecto philosophiae naturalis (...). Mobilitas videtur esse passio remota valde». ibidem, f. 3ra.
7 «Mobilitas est formaliter respectus, ergo non est formalis ratio pramenti subiecti philosophiae naturalis». ibidem, f. 2rb.
8 «Naturalitas est formalis ratio subiectiva primi subiecti philosophiae naturalis. Voco autem naturalitatem propriam ipsum quidditatem, seu formalitatem substantiae, quae approprieat ipsum substantiam ut sit subiectum motus et aliarum passionum subiecti propri naturalis et convertibiliter inhaerentium» ibidem, f. 3rb.
9 «Ista decem sunt idem convertibiliter: corpus, corpus mobile, corpus sensibile, corpus naturale, ens mobile, ens sensibile, ens naturale, substantia mobilis, substantia sensibilis, substantia naturalis. Huius ratio, quia physica e loquendo unum non est plus quam alterum» Theodoricus, op. cit., f. 1vb.
10 «Corpus est subiectum praecisive et per se in tota physica (...). Corporeitas est formalis ratio subiecta vel subiectandi praecisive. (...) Posteriora sunt denominative primi, puta corporis per se, quia mobilitas, sensibilitas, naturalitas adequantur corpori, quia unum et idem per plures potest habere partes adaequatas». ibidem, f. 1vb.
It can be noted, then, that the position of Theodoricus differs considerably from that of an orthodox Averroist, e.g. John of Jandun. The latter firmly upholds the opinion of Averroes (and Aristotle) that it is \textit{corpus mobile} which is the subject of natural philosophy, stressing as much its corporeity as mobility. Moreover, he claims that everything which is mobile is a body, defining the latter as a three-dimensional substance\textsuperscript{11}. Therefore, he can concede ens mabile to be the subject of natural philosophy inasmuch as it is understood as \textit{substantia mobilis}\textsuperscript{12}.

In the other question, in which Theodoricus cites Antonius, the problem discussed is not only whether the potency of matter is identical with its essence but also that of different aspects of that potency. According to Theodoricus, Antonius solves the problem as follows. Potency of matter is understood in a double way: either as a fundament or as \textit{respectus}, the latter being further divided into \textit{respectus aptitudinalis} and \textit{respectus actualis}\textsuperscript{13}. Of these three types of potency, the first is not different from matter, either really or formally, the second — is not different really but is different formally, the third — is different really from matter\textsuperscript{14}. The three types of potency refer to matter considered in general, matter of the \textit{inseparables}, and matter of the \textit{separables}, respectively. Regrettably, he does not explain the terms \textit{separabilis} and \textit{inseparabilis}.

Again, as in the case of the first reference to Antonius, the most likely source of the citation seems to be \textit{De tribus principiis}. And indeed, one of its questions \textit{Utrum privatio quae est tertium principium in natura sit idem realiter quod potentia materiae} provides ample material concerning the subject in question. The division of the potency of matter presented before by Theodoricus is almost a quotation from the \textit{solutio propria} of Antonius’ question with a slight termi-

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Alio modo accipitur corpus pro substantia subiecta trine dimensioni et hoc modo intelligitur cum dicitur corpus mobile esset subjectum in scientia naturali}. Johannes de Janduno, \textit{Quaestiones in VIII libros Physicorum}, Venetiis 1544, f. 2vb.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ideo cum dico ens mobile oportet per ipsum intelligi substantia mobilis; ut sit idem dicere ens mobile et substantia mobilis}. \textit{Ibidem}, f. 3ra.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Potentia captur dupliciter: uno modo pro fundamento, alio modo pro respectu; et hoc dupliciter: uno modo pro respectu aptitudinali, alio modo pro respectu actuali}. Theodoricus, \textit{op. cit.}, f. 13vb.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Potentia materiae accepta pro fundamento non distinguitur a materia. Et probatur (...),quia idem realiter non distinguitur a se ipso (...). Potentia accepta pro respectu aptitudinali non distinguitur realiter a materia (...) [sed] distinguitur a materia aliquo modo, idest formali modo. (...) Potentia accepta pro respectu actuali distinguitur realiter a materia}. \textit{Ibidem}, f. 13vb.
nological difference: in *De tribus principiis* Antonius speaks of *respectus abiciens formam* alternately with *respectus aptitudinalis* and uses the term *respectus coniunctus actui* interchangeably with *respectus actualis*\(^{15}\).

The presentation of the relations between the potencies in question and matter contained in *De tribus principiis* also seems to have formed the immediate source of Theodoricus’ citation, since all the theses reported by him have their direct counterparts in Antonius; moreover, the obscure remark about *separabiles* and *inseparabiles* finds its explanation there, too. The actual potency is called *separabiles*, because it refers to an act, i.e. a form, which is something separable from matter, hence it must be really different from matter; the aptitudinal potency, on the other hand, refers to matter as apt to receive a form and therefore is inseparable from it really but only formally\(^{16}\).

As it has been said before, the presentation of Antonius’ views concerning the problem of the potency of matter occupies a special place in Theodoricus’ question devoted to the issue. Not only it is not just one of *rationes principales*, from which it is separated by the expression of authority of Averroes and the resulting conclusions, but also is not explicitly polemicised with. Theodoricus remarks only that it differs from the intentions of Aristotle and Averroes, similarly to the ones cited in *rationes principales*, and that all of them are false in accepting an accident truly superadded *in simplicibus* in the same way as *in compositis*, which does not really seem to be an argument directed against Antonius.

Theodoricus’ own solution, which follows after a number of distinctions, is offering another division of the potencies of matter. First of all, there is the potency of the prime matter, which is not diff-

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\(^{15}\) «Materia est essentialiter potentia; potentia autem potest sumi dupliciter, scilicet pro respectu vel pro fundamento, quod est ipsa substantia materiae. Iste etiam respectus potest sumi dupliciter: vel ut est coniunctus actui, idest formae ad quam est, vel ut est abiciens formam» Antonius Andreae, *op. cit.*, f. 22va.

\(^{16}\) «Potentia materiae accepta pro respectu aptitudinali distinguitur a materia aliquote modo ex natura rei, scilicet formaliter, hanc ostendo sic: (...) quod non est idem alteri in primo modo dicendi per se, distinguitur formaliter ab eo. (...) Sed potentia materiae sic accepta est huiusmodi respectu materiae. (...) Potentia materiae accepta pro respectu actuali distinguitur realiter a materia. Hanc ostendo sic: Quicquid ab alio potest realiter separari ab eo realiter distinguitur. Sed potentia materiae sic accepta potest a materia realiter separari, (...) quia omnis respectus est realiter separabilis cuius terminus est realiter separabilis. Forma autem, quae est terminus talis respectus realiter est separabilis a materia». *Ibidem*, f. 23rb.
different from it really directly, i.e. as two different things, but is different from it really indirectly, i.e. formally; the latter term is understood by Theodoricus as a difference between a thing and its mode, or between two modes of a thing. Theodoricus stresses that in prime matter potency is its essential mode, inherent to it, and that there is no other potency in it, since it is simple. As far as second matter is concerned, Theodoricus allows plurality of potencies here, as it is a composite; he characterizes them as different from the essence of matter really directly, because they are accidents superadded to it.\textsuperscript{17}

Juxtaposing Theodoricus' concept of the potency of matter with that of John of Jandun shows some differences between them. John's division of potencies is fairly similar to that of Antonius: he divides it first into \textit{subiectum potens}, corresponding to Antonius' \textit{fundamentum}, and a formal principle which is a \textit{respectus}, further subdivided into the one referring to the agent, i.e. form, and the one referring matter's aptitude to receive a form. In the first instance the potency is essentially identical with matter, in the remaining two - it is not\textsuperscript{18}. It seems that Theodoricus takes from John only the radical twofold division of potency but applies to a problem formulated in a different way. Yet, it is visible that this shift of subject cannot be attributed to the influence of Antonius.

The above analysis of the references to Antonius Andreae in the \textit{Quaestiones super Physicam} by Theodoricus of Magdeburg allows for a number of conclusions. In the first place, the citations from Antonius, few as they appear, are analysed by him very scrupulously and in a friendly or even favourable way. Although he never accepts Antonius' positions totally, he nevertheless modifies the Averroist stand,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} «Potentia materiae primae non differt ab essentia eius realiter et directe. (...) Haec potentia differt ab eius essentia realiter et indirecte. (...) Potentia materiae secundae differt ab eius essentia realiter et directe. (...) Probatur [quia] accidens verum superaddens differt realiter a subiecto directe, sed potentia materiae secundae est accidens superaddens ipsi, ergo etc.». Theodoricus, \textit{op. cit.} f. 14rb.
\item \textsuperscript{18} «Potentiam nos possumus intelligere duo: uno modo — subiectum potens, alio modo — formale principium, scilicet respectum seu habitudinem ad formam generandam vel ad agens. (...) Potentia, si sumatur pro subiecto potente, est idem essentialiter cum materia. (...) Si sumatur potentia pro formali principio quo materia dicitur potens — et sic non est idem substantialiter vel essentialiter cum substantia materiae».

«Potentia materiae, quod est eius accidens potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad privationem formae ad quam est potentia, (...) alio modo (...) — quantum ad aptitudinem materiae ad recipiendum formam ipsam». Johannes de Janduno, \textit{op. cit.} f. 21vab.
\end{itemize}
either by accepting certain Scotist elements, or moving the whole solution towards a more conciliatory option.

In the first question we could see an instance of modification of the latter kind. In stressing the role of corpus and corporeity at the same time downplaying the role of mobility, Theodoricus not only abandons a clearly Averroistic position but also moves towards the view considering natural substance to be the subject of physics. His acceptance of so many definitions of the subject of natural philosophy as equivalent may seem to anticipate the philosophical eclecticism, which was to come towards the end of the century, however, it is worth noting, that his own solution of the issue is highly original.

In the other question, the possible influence by Antonius’ opinions is more difficult to trace, as its main attraction is the uniqueness of the solution. It is interesting to observe that Theodoricus’ commitment to the physical way of explanation is more consistent than that of either Antonius or John of Jandun. Whereas both of them analyse the problem of potency of nature in ontological terms, following the example of Averroes, Theodoricus only notes the triple, or — more precisely — twice double division in the exposition of the authority but he makes no use of it further on, since it refers to matter per se. However, some influence of Antonius, or Scotism in general, can be seen in his use of the term «formal difference», applied in the considerations of prime matter.

It seems, therefore, that we are justified in saying that Theodoricus’ peep onto the doctrine of Scotism, as presented by Antonius Andreae was long and careful enough to be called a gaze, too.
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