Strategic Points of Japan–North Korea Relations

Introduction

The difficult neighborhood of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (previously Korea) and Japan has been an ongoing issue in terms of regional security of Northeast Asia. The problem of Korea and Japan’s proximity has been largely affecting the Asian affairs for over a century, as neither party has been close to reconciliation. The lack of official diplomatic relations between the two countries, dating back to the division of the peninsula into two separate entities recognized by the international community, does not seem to ease the tension. The weight of historical claims on each side of the conflict and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear doctrine clashing with Japanese nonproliferation and disarmament policy create a solid base for constant political stalemate.

The case study attempts to draw up a sketch of the convoluted relations between advanced Japanese democracy and North Korea’s “rogue regime” (Becker 2006), which is a rarely discussed matter in Polish academic works. The article determines the main obstacles for successful reconciliation of the opposite parties, basing on multiple scientific and media sources, including present Japanese press and Japanese governmental data. The author focuses on the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula and explores its influence on current bilateral relations. The author also outlines the rudimentary problem of abductions of Japanese citizens conducted by the North Korean intelligence, and correlates it
with current actions of countries’ leaders. The issue seems to be especially relevant in 2014, when the feuding parties picked up the course of dialogue and negotiations, leaving chances for future reconciliation open.

**Occupation of the Korean Peninsula**

The Japanese occupied the Korean Peninsula for a long 35 years – from 1910 up to their defeat in World War II (Ryang 2000, p. 1). Their reign was based on a flagship policy called *Naisen ittai*, introduced by the Japanese General Minami Jirō, who governed annexed Korea from 1936 to 1942 (Hunter 1984, p. 102). The Japanese approach focused on making Japan and Korea “one body” (Djun Kil Kim 2005, p. 136) at all costs. Imperial rule aimed at securing a high life standard for the Japanese people, even if it meant suppressing Korea’s culture, draining its natural resources and making Koreans feel like second-class citizens in their own fatherland. All actions of the invader were supposed to prepare the Japanese Empire for further economical and political expansion in the region (Rurarz 2009, p. 329).

Japanese domination on the Korean Peninsula in the 20th century has caused a major damage both to Korea’s national identity and to the state’s welfare. The traditional Korean legal system has been destroyed and replaced with the Japanese normative acts (Cooper 2009, p. 154). Due to law transformation farmers had to give up their lands. 12 million Korean peasants were dispossessed of their estates and needed to retrain in order to become factory workers (Rurarz 2009, pp. 330–331). More than 600,000 Koreans were sent to Japan as labor force, mainly for mining, civil engineering and other branches of industry (Ryang 2000, p. 3). Under the Japanese rule the Korean national spirit was weakened and repressed. Consequently, their language has been banned from public use (Morillot & Malovic 2012, p. 208) and Korean children were not accepted to primary schools. According to Joanna Rurarz (2009, p. 331), only 3.7% of Korean children would receive elementary education. Furthermore, historical books were banned from libraries and burned (Cooper 2009, p. 154) by the invader and many works of art were sent abroad across the Sea of Japan (Rurarz 2009, p. 332). Koreans were also forced to practice Shinto – the indigenous religion of the occupying forces (Rurarz 2009, p. 345).

The people of Korea strongly opposed this subjugation and fought for freedom. At the beginning of 1919 a series of peaceful demonstrations
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(known as “The March First Movement”) broke out in Seoul and soon spread across the country [Korean National Association n.d]. Koreans after nine years of subordination, empowered by Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” statement, issued a manifesto. A student named Jung Jae-Young made a memorable speech [Katsiaficas 2012, p. 43]: “We hereby declare that Korea is an independent state and that Koreans are a self governing people. We proclaim it to the nations of the world in affirmation of the principle of the equality of all nations, and we proclaim it to our posterity, preserving in perpetuity the right of national survival. We make this declaration on the strength of five thousand years of history as an expression of the devotion and loyalty of twenty million people” (Lee 1996, p. 432).

Subsequently, the abovementioned statement was presented to large audiences in Korea’s major cities and triggered a nation-wide resistance. The illegal mass gatherings and walks of Koreans, who were formally subjects of Emperor Yoshihito, provoked a ruthless reaction from the Japanese forces. The date of March 1, 1919, went down in history due to the infamous brutality of the occupant towards the demonstrators, who gathered on that day in an estimate number of 1,000,000 [Katsiaficas 2012, p. 43]. During the political turmoil of an unexpected scale, which resulted from multilayer discrimination of Koreans and their deep yearning for freedom, many Koreans died, were injured or arrested while or as a consequence of participating in anti-Japanese rallies. Thanks to the 2013 discovery of a report, which was prepared under the orders of the first South Korean president, Rhee Syngman, the Ministry of Security and Public Administration was able to present a complex documentation on 630 victims of the repressed independence movement [The Kyunghyang Shinmun 2013].

Japanese impudence and brutality in annexed Korea fluctuated through the following years, only to reach its peak in 1941, when the Pacific War broke out and the Japanese invasion in Asia developed. To begin with, in 1940, Koreans, who were very attached to family ties, had to adopt new Japanese names. For Korean women the sōshikaiméi policy was very difficult to accept, as changing names was highly disrespectful to the old homeland custom dating back to the 14th century [Ryang 2000, pp. 2–3]. Further on, in 1943, Korean men were forced to join the army, some of them were appointed to guard camps for the prisoners of war. As a result “after the war, twenty-three Koreans were executed as Japanese

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1 The custom had been introduced in order to distinguish between the clans and to prevent marriages within a clan.
war criminals and 125 served postwar sentences as war criminals” (Ryang 2000, p. 3). About 750,000 Koreans were sent as forced laborers to mines or factories (Ishikida 2005, p. 37). Children were obliged to work in the fields and to secure war fortifications (Rurarz 2009, p. 344). According to Amnesty International from 80,000 to 200,000 woman and girls, called by the Japanese “the comfort women” were kept by the army as sex slaves (Amnesty International n.d.). Until 2008, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a governmental body of the Republic of Korea, had received 10,907 petitions to investigate i.a. Japanese atrocities committed during the occupation of Korea.

The Imperial Japanese Army is also infamous for its Unit 731, a special division formed to develop a weapon of mass destruction program (BBC News 2002), under which numerous gruesome and violent experiments were performed on humans, mainly Chinese and Korean citizens (The Guardian 2011). The tormentors have tested biological and chemical warfare on the imprisoned. The inmates were tortured, had their limbs amputated and were even cut open without any anesthesia after they had been injected with different viruses and bacteria (BBC News 2002).

Many Koreans find the aforementioned deeds both unpardonable and unforgettable. A deep feeling of humiliation and insult coming from years of Japanese power play is one of the main drives for the current DPRK’s homeland and foreign policy. Japan is the second best target for the regime’s chauvinistic propaganda. North Korean books disrespect the Japanese nation, refer to the Japanese as bastards and portray the people as greedy beings without right to humane treatment (Myers 2011, p. 108). The Japanese are also routinely offended by the state media, called “yellow midgets” (Morillot & Malovic 2008, p. 209) or Japs (Myers 2001, p. 107) and pointed as one of the biggest of North Korea’s enemies (only the Americans receive more negative publicity in the Hermit Kingdom). The DPRK’s authorities refer to the Japanese as “a race bad by nature, which will never be able to change” and “a race with which Koreans will always have to be in hostile relations” (Myers 2011, p. 110). It has to be stated here that the disruptive influence of Japanese wartime occupation of the Korean Peninsula is such a serious issue to North Koreans, that the national myth of the country’s founder bases itself on the hatred towards invaders. It revolves around Kim Il Sung’s glorious achievement – recognized only by communist’s hagiography – the establishment of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla in 1932 (Dziak 2001, p. 135).
Certainly the ability to overcome historical reasons will be one of the key factors leading to a possible reconciliation between the two nations. Of course the talks focusing on proper pardon for the war crimes will be anticipated by North Korean officials. It is highly possible that during the negotiations Pyongyang’s authorities will try to discredit the letter of apology, issued in 1989 by the Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru, which was brought to Kim Il Sung by an unofficial delegation (Arase 1993, pp. 81–82). The DPRK’s officials will probably also use all measures available to diminish the role of Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō’s apology, expressed in the 2002 at the Japan–North Korea summit meeting (The New York Times 2002). Of course this course of action will have to do with money claims aimed at the Japanese, who will not be able to avoid the issue of war reparations. The DPRK’s authorities, who are in constant need for hard currency, are well aware of the fact that South Korea has accepted compensation worth $300 million in grants and $200 million in loans under the 1965 treaty that normalized relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (Korea Herald 2014).

Abduction Problem

North Korea’s postwar list of illegal and malicious activities are also a great obstacle towards the two countries’ rapprochement. The most difficult subject, and number one on the list of factors dividing the two countries, is the issue of abductions of Japanese citizens, as it violates and undermines the sovereignty of Japan, as some of the kidnappings were performed on the Japanese soil and compromises country’s security.

Though the abductions took place probably mostly in the 1970s and 1980s (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2012), they are still a burning issue, creating animosities on both sides of the diplomatic conflict. On one hand there is the Japanese government that wishes to bring safely back home all the missing victims and hopes to reunite them with their families, who have been eagerly fighting for putting the spotlight on the abduction matter. On the other hand there is Pyongyang that does not want to release hostages, who were engaged in espionage and preparation of acts of terror carried out in North Korea’s neighboring countries.

There are many theories attempting to explain the genuine cause of unusual kidnappings. The most popular and commonly accepted belief

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2 The letter was accompanied by invitation of entry to United Nations.
is that by taking the Japanese citizens hostage, the North Korean intelligence has tried to intimidate South Korea’s state authorities, who claim sole power over the whole Korean Peninsula and consider themselves the only legitimate authority [Dziak & Citko, pp. 29–29]. Among other factors, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan recognizes three other significant motives, which correspond with the former. Their shortlist contains such acts of terror as: “identity theft for North Korean agents; forcing victims to train North Korean agents to act as Japanese; recruitment by the Yodo-go-group” [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2012]. Researchers attempt to find out who has given the orders to abduct or to lure the Japanese citizens to the DPRK. Specialists on the subject also try to detect the precise number of missing people.

The Japanese authorities have confirmed that 17 Japanese citizens are missing [Dziak & Citko 2009, p. 9], however, the real number of abductees remains unknown to public opinion and is probably much higher. North Korea has admitted to only 13 kidnappings, whereas Prof. Waldemar Dziak estimates that the DPRK’s agents may have abducted about 100 Japanese people [Dziak 2013, p. 126]. The unsolved matter of abductions deeply concerns the Japanese society, who has been involved in a nation-wide social campaign to raise awareness of the problem. Demonstrations and gatherings regarding the rescue of the abductees were held. Pressure put on the Japanese authorities resulted in a short diplomatic meeting on September 17, 2002, held in the DPRK, during which Kim Jong Il admitted to the abductions of 13 people. He also expressed his apology for the wrongdoings by stating that “It is regretful [the abductions, author’s annotation] and I want to frankly apologize” [BBC News 2002] and stated that North Korea will refrain from such conduct in the future [Dziak & Citko 2009, p. 9]. A month later, five of the abductees returned to Japan [The Japan Times 2014]. In 2004 their families followed. Charles Robert Jenkins (a well known American deserter, who has voluntarily crossed the Korean Demilitarized Zone) was one of the rescued.

The undertaking described above has been a great diplomatic success for Koizumi Jun’ichirō’s administration. Nonetheless, the government has not been fully satisfied with its outcome. The issue of the other missing persons has not been resolved. This included the flagship case of Japan’s most recognized victim of North Korea’s abductions – Yokota Megumi. DPRK representatives have announced that the rest of the considered abductees have been classified dead or is said to have never entered North Korea. The Japanese found these explanations hard to believe and
demanded convincing proofs – which the DPRK failed to deliver. This has resulted in a serious relations crisis, which only recently seems to be warming.

The new Japanese government led by Abe Shinzō has dedicated $10 million to investigate and solve the abduction issue (East Asia Forum 2013). Japan uses i.a. the possibility of easing very strict economic sanctions, imposed on North Korea after their nuclear tests, in order to acquire a more powerful bargaining position. Positive signs in the case are beginning to appear, as Yokota’s parents, who was abducted as a thirteen-year-old girl, were able to see their granddaughter for the first time. A meeting was held on neutral grounds in Mongolia (The Japan Times 2014). Mr. Yokota has been also invited by the North Korean authorities to visit Pyongyang (The Japan Daily Press 2014). Moreover, good news came lately, as of May 2014, from Sweden, where North Koreans have agreed to allow a full-scale investigation into the abduction cases. The Japanese authorities have promised to lift the ship embargo and ease traveling and financial sanctions in return, if the process gradually progresses (NK News 2014). The news was followed by the information that Japan is likely to invite various North Korean officials to Tokyo. Just few days later Japan has also announced the possibility of sending ministerial-level officials to hold working-level talks with the regime. It is also worth mentioning that Japan is running parallel talks on the remains of the soldiers, who did not come back home from North Korea after the Second World War (The Big Story 2014).

**Missiles, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Cyber Warfare**

Another strategic point of Japan–North Korea relations is the issue of nuclear and missile testing. North Korea has already conducted three nuclear tests – in 2006, 2009 and in December of 2013 (Dziak, p. 220). The last test was preceded by the restarting of the nuclear reactor in Yongbyon (South Asia Morning Post 2014) and by the firing of a long-range missile, Unha-3 (Encyclopedia Astronautica n.d.).

Aforesaid provocations of the regime resulted in the past in multiple restrictions on relations with the already excluded, pariah, country. For instance, trade between Japan and North Korea was banned, which was rather inconvenient for North Korea, who has to rely on China’s nearly
monopolistic trade exchange (The Guardian 2006). Hard line policy was also applied to high-ranking North Koreans who were no longer allowed to visit Japan (this included members of Chongryon, which is a pro-Pyongyang association residing in Japan) (The Japan Times 2014). What is more, the United Nations (UN) with China’s support, who is constantly irritated by the excesses of the disobedient subordinate, also imposed economic sanctions on North Korea – import of specific luxurious items to North Korea was prohibited (Reuters 2013). Nonetheless, all applied coercive measures named above have not stopped North Korea from terrorizing its neighbor.

Just recently the headquarters of the aforementioned organization have been auctioned, due to its growing debt (The Japan News 2013). In consequence mutual relations may be affected, as the seat has been recognized as an unofficial North Korean diplomatic post in Tokyo.

On March 26, 2014, North Korea tested, after a four-year break, its medium range Rodong ballistic missiles (Associated Newspapers Ltd 2014). The missiles have a capacity to reach Japanese territory. The tests have been condemned by the UN, who did not have to wait long for Kim Jong Un’s response. The dictator threatened to carry out “a new form of a nuclear test” (Time 2014). American nuclear expert Jeffrey Lewis said that this could mean that the DPRK is preparing for simultaneous nuclear tests of two or more units, however, the real readiness to conduct a nuclear attack on its neighboring country is doubted by various researchers, who think that North Korean missiles do not have the capacity to mount a miniaturized nuclear warhead on the missile (Newsweek 2014).

In response to North Korea’s missile provocations, Japanese Self Defense Forces have been ordered to shoot down every missile launched from DPRK grounds. The order has remained in force for 22 days of April. Furthermore, the United States promised to send two more destroyers outfitted with missile defense systems to Japan by 2017 (The Diplomat 2014). The decision has supplemented the 2013 decision to install another missile radar site in one of Japan’s prefectures (Reuters 2013).

Nuclear safety in the region is not the only concern that worries Japan. Japan also suspects North Korea of maintaining chemical and biological weapons program. Weapons like these are substantially less expensive to produce in comparison to atomic missiles. The South Korean Ministry of National Defense has stated that the DPRK possesses potentially more than 13 kinds of biological agents, including the Variola virus, which is re-
sponsible for developing smallpox (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2014). North Korea has also created a hardly detectable laboratory infrastructure for biotechnological and chemical testing. Korea is said to be one of world’s biggest possessors of chemical weapons and can potentially produce annually ca. 4500 agent tons of chemical weapon (EU Non-Proliferation Consortium 2012).

However, the newest and also highly virulent and powerful weapon possessed by the regime is the constantly growing cyber warfare unit, whose best programmers have been trained or recruited in China. Nowadays about 3,000 troops are ready to conduct a highly efficient cyber attack (News Limited 2013). They have already proved their capacity to do so in 2011 when they managed to interfere with South Korean bank systems and successfully blocked the use of credit cards and cash machines for millions of people. In 2013 South Koreans announced that North Korean hackers had caused economic damage to the country’s budget and society in the amount of $800,000,000 (Voice of America 2013).

As stated by Kim Jong Un, “cyber warfare is just as strategically important to Pyongyang as missiles and nuclear weapons” (Voice of America 2013). This indicates that cyber terror gains special attention from the country’s elite and is said to be considered as the most developed branch of North Korea’s military, which can easily compete with other countries’ cyber forces. North Koreans have nothing to lose, as they mainly use their home made intranet, Kwangmayong, and access to the Internet is only granted to a very limited number of high-ranking officials. This is the main reason why in May 2014 the Israeli and Japanese authorities joined forces to set up cyber security programs that could prevent any potential cyber attacks on military units and strategic installations and private sector infrastructure (DEBKAfile 2014).

**Conclusion**

That being a conclusion has to be drawn by stressing that the dynamics between Japan and North Korea seem to be changing rapidly as Japan is heading towards “proactive pacifism” and is planning to raise expenses on their armaments. Prime Minister Abe is fighting to amend the Japanese Constitution, which states that Japan cannot hold an army (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet n.d.). Of course the clause is fictitious, as Japan’s Self-Defense Forces can be placed among the most powerful
armies in Asia. Since Japan is fed up with constant war threats coming from the DPRK, which refuses to shut down their nuclear program, Abe is working towards securing the right to shoot down North Korea’s missiles (The Wall Street Journal). Japan wants also to become more independent from its American ally and the six party talks, which have not been a sufficient instrument to grant stability in the region of Northeast Asia.

The strategic points mentioned above only depict strained relations between the two most solitary countries in Asia. Both sides have recently expressed their willingness to reengage in establishing official political relations. Kim Jong Un, as a new leader, is craving for his first big success in diplomacy. Nonetheless, a major improvement of relations is not expected as the simple rule “one step forward two steps backward” can be easily applied to North Korea’s behavior in the international arena. Yet, with both parties responsive, Japan–DPRK diplomacy has faced a fresh start due to intense talks, concerning fundamental and divisive issues, held in 2014.

References

Books

**Websites**

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